Abstract-To explain the necessity of comprehensive and automatically analysis process for volatile memory, this paper summarized ordinarily analyzing methods and their common points especially for concerned data source. Then, a memory analysis framework Volatiltiy-2.2 and statistical output file size are recommended. In addition, to address the limitation of plug-ins classification in analyzing procedure, a user perspective classify is necessary and proposed. Furthermore, according to target data source differences on the base of result data set volume and employed relational method is introduced for comprehensive analysis guideline procedure. Finally, a test demo including DLLs loading order list analyzing is recommend, in which DLL load list is regard as different kind of characteristics typical data source with process and convert into process behavior fingerprint. The clustering for the fingerprint is employed string similar degree algorithm model in the demo, which has a wide range applications in traditional malware behavior analysis, and it is proposed that these methods also can be applied for volatile memory.
I. INTRODUCTION
As hard drives storage and memory-resident malicious software applications increasing, hard disk is not the only way to detect malware. Main memory analysis is beginning by the Digital Forensic Research Workgroup (DFRWS) challenge at 2005 [1] , nowadays variety technique and tools can acquire and analysis mostly information stored in RAM, including processes, system registry, network, files and system state or application specific information [2] . Michael etc. in their book also provide several chapters to explain how to use information upon performing malicious code analysis manually [3] . Thus, memory dumps are considered as a needed part of malware analyzing process, such as Celeda etc. employ pattern searching to extract botnet distribution sites from the current content of memory [4] .
Although the memory dump as a storage medium is much smaller than hard disk, which means it has advantages of searching speed and disadvantages of data lacking, the results from modern tools are no longer suitable for in-time analyzing or multiple images correlation analyzing. Investigators who are not experienced performing a memory analysis is no longer a relaxing task, as he needs to make a decision of "the suspicious" from mass of connections, processes, files or DLLs records. The same predicament may be faced in ordinary malicious code detection methods, hence depending on detection algorithm is the best choice, which is widely applied and usually classified as heuristic-based and signaturebased method [5] .
The paper is organized as follows. After the Introduction, Section II presents an overview of detection technique of malware aiming at the combination with machine learning or data mining and available feature of volatile memory for analyzing malware. Section III introduces a statistics test of techniques and plug-ins to perform an independent memory analysis and propose difficulties of both automatically and manual analysis, and a brand new classification of memory analysis plug-ins from the point of users. Section IV presents a guidance procedure to perform a comprehensive analysis. Furthermore, description of typical malware such as BlackEnergy Version 2 or a sample image including variety browsers, and all testing results based on it are included.
II. ORDINARY MALWARE ANALYSIS AND RELATED WORKS
Volatile memory is quiet a fresh data source for malware detect. RAM is regard as volatile because it cannot store data all the time especially after power off. But this feature is not a barrier to malicious code analysis as many methods also apply volatile data such as dynamically observing a running malware or network flows to analysis botnet, which will be introduced detailed in 2.1. In order to distinguish with dynamic analysis, the volatile memory in this paper is depend on memory dumps or images acquiring form Virtual Machine or tools, rather than directly on a living machine. The added benefit is memory state would not be changed as machine running. The memory dump acquired by this way is a kind of snapshot, but different from photograph in daily life, memory dump would record some information not only in this time point but also in the past, which can be compared to a photograph with a long exposure time. The main reason of this is due to the operating system's memory management mechanism, and detail explanation would be introduced in 2.2.
A. Malicious Software Analysis Techniques
Security researchers are focus on both malware activity behaviors and techniques of avoiding detected, and antivirs malware label usually including process, files, registry keys and network access information. Some considers the correlation of these features and performs analysis based on the whole. Willems etc. provide that the files created or modified by malware, registry changes, loaded DLLs, virtual memory accessed, process, network connection and other information such as installed services are the key element in malware activity analysis [6] . Bailey etc. apply clustering in his work to group malwares, and the behavioural fingerprint employed to running clustering is the changes of system state [7] . Others pay attention to single attribute, such as system calls. Newsome etc. apply the relationship between system calls to discover feature of malwares by the way of statistics compare method [8] . Christodorescu etc. specify malware behaviours by the dependence of system calls [9] , which means an ordering dependency of the first system call must precede the second system call. Data mining is widely used in mass data set analysis, such as Chen etc. apply clustering algorithm to classify the source of spam images [10] , and Wang etc. employ information fusion to achieve a better detection effect for botnet [11] .
In many applications, such as botnet detection [12] and video recognitions [13] , behaviour or feature sequence contrastive analysis is often applied. A common way is to abstract the sequence as a string defined on finite set. There are many algorithms on it such as Levenshtein Distance, LCS (Longest Common Substance) and NCD (Normalized compression distance) [14] . Zhang etc. apply the similarity of anchor texts corresponding to the link and based on this obtain the optimistic topic similarity [15] .
Typical volatile data for analysing malicious code is network flow, which is employed in botnet detection techniques. To deal with volatile data, some methods are record the net flow at ISP backbone network [16] , and others monitor network flow at the gateway of experiment environment [17] .
Hence the target data and relational methods of analyzing malware can be summarized as follow:
 Processes, files, registry, network information and system calls are still key features.  The relationship can be classified as internalrelationship (ex. order of system calls) and external-relationship (ex. clustering of key features above).  Always changing is the volatile data characteristic, so it may benefit from comparing the single element state changes or monitoring entire quantitative changes.
B. RAM Component for Malware Detection
The method of Schuster analysis the main memory structures represent processes and threads in 2006 [18] , in which they improve the search pattern in order to scanning the whole memory dump for the trace of processes, threads and other objects recorded by kernel. For details, by this way the DKOM can be easily detected as _EPROCESS structure is only unlinked from the list rather than totally destroyed, and hided processes can be acquired by comparing the double link list of _EPROCESS with directory searching for the structure. Another significance of this method is that finished processes also can be found as the same reason. This is why volatile memory can store some old information.
Another source of concern is DLL, it can be found though PEB included in _EPROCESS structure and VAD structure [19] . Compared the difference between two source of DLL list can find those unlinked DLL from PEB by malwares. The method for finding VAD is similar to _EPROCESS. Through these operating system kernel objects, finding information as sockets, connections and files is not a difficulty, detail method can be found in [2] , and the supporting tools and plug-ins will be introduced in next section.
III. MEMORY ANALYSIS PLUG-INS
In this chapter, we employ a powerful memory analysis framework: Volatility-2.2 to finish our testing, which is written by Python and implements a great part of concepts and methods we have outline in this paper. The memory dump we employed is a sample memory image infected by Black Energy Version 2 from its homepage (http://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/SampleMemoryI mages). Black Energy is a popular DDoS Trojan gained in 2008, and Black Energy 2 has been in quiet development for an over years, which uses modern rootkit/processes injection techniques, strong encryption and a modular architecture [20] . 
A. Plug-ins Function and Output Data Size Analysis
Now we find that volatile memory also can provide basic data for analyzing malware as traditional way. Furthermore, it may provide a more centralized data set of sensitive information. As working on memory dumps, analyzing process can be employed without influence by running of target machine continually. The first time Volatility has been highlight is in 2011 [2] , and it integrated over twenty plug-ins in version 1.x at that time. But in version 2.2, the number of plug-ins has increased to over seventy. The volatility homepage classified plugins into ten groups for Window and six group for Linux [21] . The details of classified for Window are in Table I . The numbers of plug-ins in each group is different, in addition Windows GUI, processes and DLLs, malware and kernel memory and objects are nearly equal to each other and the total of them is in the majority. The percent of each group can be found in Table I. Based on this statistics, it provides a set of tools rather than a guiding process to perform analyzing malware. The divide for groups has neither hierarchy nor ordering, so it brings several problems such as: whether go to next group until a group is running finished, some plug-ins has similar content but classified in different group, some plug-ins in the same group but has no close relationship for analyzing malware activity. Employing this original set of plug-ins requires users have a great deal experience and able to operate them skillfully. Thus it is not suitable for implementing automatically instead of manually. On the other hand, we test fifty plug-ins with a memory dump which has size of 128MB and contrast the size of output files and the result is in Fig. 1 . All the output files are stored in format of .txt. The horizontal axis present plug-ins and the vertical axis has unit of Kb, so (a) is those below 10KB, and (b) is upon 10KB. The result shows that half of plug-ins output can be analyzed manually as it has a smaller size. But the others are hard to do so especially for those upon 50KB. If this is not explained clearly, we can use the plug-in dlllist as an example for which has an output size of 66KB, but it has 1040 lines of DLL records. Even if an experienced investigator also needs some simple command such as grep to help to find suspicious DLL. And other information like DLL loaded order between different processes is also hardly to be compared with eyes.
B. Relationship between Plug-ins and Classify
On the basic of predecessors' experience, we propose the summarized plug-in classification and their relationship which are shown in Fig. 2 . The organization of the structure is not a coincidence, and we can give a reasonable explanation by the analysis given as above. There is no doubt that processes are the key concept for all operating system theory. Therefore, process as a dynamic factor is surrounded by much useful information in main memory, such as cause the change of operating system integrity, leave a mark or clues or become the lord of the interaction with outside by creating sockets and sending packets. So in this classification structure process node is one of the centralized nodes of others. Another important node is DLL, which can be found from several sources such as process, VAD and module. We also put registry as a single circle in this structure because its important position for analyzing malware and fortunately Volatility support registry analyzing either. 
IV. GUIDELINE PROCEDURE AND TEST DEMO
All the work can begin at the process list and go along with suspicious processes and check other information according to them. But to deal with DLLs is not seem to be easy. In order to get a clearly thinking line, we present a suggested process in Fig. 3 , in which the work is begin at identification of a memory dump, and this step provide acquired time, system type and other basic information. Then we divide the plug-in or data into two flows: process flow and DLL flow. The result of each flow should be employed data pre-processing, in which step data is organized in structured data type and compare task also need to be done, then all the result need to be recorded or stored in database. After that the analysis process is began in three ways. As DLL information is a mass of data, automatically analysis strategy should be employed here. And for processes or registry, manual analysis is acceptable if necessary. Another reason for diving process and DLL is the relationship difference between their owing features. As we mentioned before, the relationship among DLLs is a kind of internal relationship which can be defined as sequence, but for process it is external relationship.
There may be an interactive between DLL analyzing and process analyzing because each one can provide useful suggestion for another. But this part is different from correlation. In correlation step, the aim is to improving accuracy for the whole process, more intelligent algorithm is need. The same as classification mentioned above, registry is a single part with less contact to others, but simply dropping them out is unwise, so as other information we do not highlight. Due to this part would get a small data size, it can be performed manually or applied key record searching to get the results. 
A. Process Analyzing and Data Pre-processing
In the process flow we take psscan as the most common plug-in, and its running result is shown in Fig. 4 , which show the process basic information and creation relationship. Furthermore, those processes which have existed or been hidden are also can be shown. For this reason, processes hidden techniques as DKOM can be found directly. Another way to hide a process is force a process to be a parent process of malware [22] , or an advanced method is named process hollowing, and both of them is hard to analysis just from the result as in Fig. 4 . But process flow also can provide recommendation for investigators, and an intuitional question is whether processes having same parent and same name is really doing same thing. For example, if start a process as a Window service, it will regard services.exe as its parent, of which pid equals 676 in this case. Then we can find that there are several processes named svchost.exe running, such as pid of 1028, 936, 1148, 856 and 1088. The same situation can be found between pid of 468 and 1732, they own same name wuauclt.exe and same parent process 1028. Due to malware may do something in another process context by code injection or let it load malicious DLLs, and bring these problems we go to step of DLL flow next chapter.
As we have discussed before, use dlllist commend can get a mass of result data for active DLLs, which is shown in Fig. 5 . It walks the doubly-liked list of LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY structures which is point to by the PEB's InLoadOrderModuleList [21] , and it means we can get the DLL load order of a process.In the step of data pre-processing of DLL, considering the analyzing efficient and accuracy, we follow basic rules: firstly, such mass of data should be compressed; secondly, order characteristics should be retaining as much as possible. The result from this step can be regard as a kind of DLL fingerprint for processes. But different from file digest, loading order should be kept, so algorithm such as MD5 is not suitable in this case. A common solution is providing global ID for every DLL, and process is presented as a list of DLL IDs. In order to avoiding duplicate ID, we need a list to store those DLLs which have been recorded before. One thing needs to be paid more attention is this list must be global for a single experiment. So we can store the list in DLL Log (in Fig. 4 ), when we do next experiment, DLL Log should be search firstly and new DLLs not existing in Log would be accept to mark a new ID. 
B. DLL Fingerprint Comparing
Malware activity and feature also be described as a list of behaviour sequence.While examining internalrelationship provides useful information for particular process, our goals is to compare DLL loading order and point out meaningful difference. A fairly intuitive approach is based on the concept of edit distance [23] . In this approach the loading order is transformed a string, and the difference between DLL load activities is equal to the difference between two strings. The basic idea of edit distance is that: the whole class of string metrics that measure distance as the number of operations required to transform a string to another [23] . For example, if we define the weight of insert, delete and substitute can be 1, 1 and 2, and calculate "sufferer" to "hacker", we should delete "s" and "u" then transfer "ffer" to "hack", so the value is 10. The delete and add operation need not to exist at the same time if the length of two string is determined, which means the shorter is before the longer and exchange two string if necessary. 151  103  676  70  70  463  49  65  46  117  688  109 109  411  100 107  120  106  844  99  99  524  77  97  54  174  856  110 110  399  109 104  132  888  105 105  529  80  102  59  177  936  71  71  459  51  41  109  1028 447 447  459 443  480  399  1084 68  68  443  56  68  51  132  1088 72  72  410  41  53  132  1148 71  71  386  51  53  104  1432 106 106  382  113 102  126  114  1668 169 169  447  181 170  191  160  1724 146 146  474  162 143  177  130  1732 0  469  71  71  72  110  1788 78  78  443  52  72  59  136  1968 68  68  410  56  66  53  131 The typical processes mentioned in chapter A and edit distance calculate results is shown in Table II . It is clear that pid=468 and pid=1732 has an amazing result of "0", which means that their order of active DLLs loading are same and they has great probability having same activity. But for pid=1028, 936, 1148 and 1088, the answer may not be obviously. The mainly reason for this is only using one value, the similarity or edit distance in this case, to measure two DLL fingerprint is too thin. In order to improve the robust of analysis, we present a average method to analysis similarity more forward. Basic idea of this method is that if two processes has closer similarity value to the third process, we can regard this two processes are similar to each other. Although there will be a special situation that the two is similar to different part of the third one, when the quality of reference is big enough, the influence will be reduced.
A simple demo for the five processes we mentioned before is shown in Fig. 6 . One thing should be attention is that the line between points does not really exist and the reason of showing them is for a better observation. The pid=1028 and 856 is quite different from the other three, not only for its high value but also for changing tendency. Actually, from the result of processes scan in Figure 4 , it is clearly that pid=1028 is parent processes of three pro-cess, but pid=936, 1148 and 1088 do not create any process, which shows that typical activity can be reflected in DLL fingerprint and similarity analysis results. Black Energy Version 2 is a kind of botnet for DDoS, which has several main functions: firstly, it can hide its malicious code to avoid being detected by anti-virus. Secondly, it can infect system processes. Lastly, like most of botnet program, it can receive instructions from command and control center [20] . Its work flow is shown in Fig. 7 . Its infecting target is system process svchost.exe. There are always several svchost.exe exist, some of them is for remote procedure call, and others for sharing by many services. Process wuauclt.exe is checking for updates all the time for Window auto update. In this case, its parent process is svchost.exe with pid=1028. Difference of changing in Fig. 6 clusters processes named "svchost.exe" into two groups, in another word, we can say that their average similarity is approximate. In addition, the same situation is also suitable for wuauclt.exe and its parent process. Another demo runs on a browser image sample for four kinds of popular browsers: Chrome, Sougo, Firefox and IE. The process creation relationship is in Fig. 8 . And we calculate their average similarity as above and result is in Fig. 9 . In this memory sample, we apply these browsers to open the same page, which means they do the same things and may look like with same behavior. But as we all know, they own different rendering engine with each other, except IE and Sougo. This feature is clearly shown in Fig. 9 . The father process in group of Sougo with pid=888 is quite similar with IE processes. But Chrome and Firefox with pid=3824 and pid=2428 are rather different from those two. There are a cluster for other lines, and most of them present child processes of Sougo and Chrome. From this result we can guess that they still own partial similar behavior especially in child processes except for different rendering engine. 
C. Discussion
In this chapter, we will discuss our test result and several problems further more. Plug-in dlllist can only list those active DLLs, although there is another method can list those released DLLs, the sequence of them cannot be guaranteed, and algorithm must be different for such unordered mass data.
Moreover, just as traditional way of malware behavior analysis, build behavior figure print for malware is still a key problem. In our model, this work is finished in the step of data pre-processing.
Shortage of edit distance method is its result would be influenced by the length of string. For example, if the short string is a part of the long one, but their edit distance is still equal to the difference between their length. So the actual calculate value is less significant than "changing trend", or average value for discrete points in this case.
In this paper, we choose the other processes in same image as one process' reference to calculate average similarity. Another way is build some standard processes sample instead of random choice. Each of them may has one and only one mainly feature such as: lots of network connections, file read or write. Extra storage space is needed by this way.
Process analysis and DLL analysis interactive and correlation may not highlight in test demo. But it still exist the main idea of it. Pay attention to the way we choose process to check their DLL loading list in terms of process name and their parent process. The comparison is also employed between brother processes. All the reference information is come from process flow.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As we have discussed in Section III, data analyzed from volatile memory should be classified. Top principles are the size of results set and data record relationship. Then whether it is sequential data or not is considered. These principles have been employed in ordinary malware analyzing method, and we propose that they are still suitable for volatile memory analysis. The difference is memory dump is a dynamic snapshot in which we lose data integrity so we need to employ as much information as possible from it. It is why comprehensive analysis is highlight.
In future, the whole procedure needs to be further tested and some modules require specific implementation so that it can obtain an acceptable result. His research interests are in operating systems, computer networks and information security.
